MercoPress. South Atlantic News Agency

Astonishing weapons sales plan for Argentina

British Defence Ministry officials incredibly considered selling powerful weapons to Argentina only months before the 1982 Falklands War invasion, including an aircraft carrier, Sea Harrier strike aircraft, Vulcan bombers and battle tanks, even though the British intelligence services were warning that Argentina might be considering “full scale military invasion”. The sales did not go ahead and all these weapons subsequently deployed by Britain were vital factors in winning the war.

The idea of weapons sales to Argentina were made even as Britain and Argentina were engaged in negotiations seeking a solution to the 150-year-old sovereignty dispute including talks deliberately kept secret from the Falkland Islanders.

These are among astonishing revelations made public in the Official History of the Falklands Campaign by a distinguished military academic, Sir Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies and Vice-Principal of King's College, London, who was given access to previously secret documents when the Government asked him to embark on this task.

Sir Lawrence declares: "One indication of the lack of concern within the Ministry of Defence ? although this went too far for most ? was an idea from Defence Sales that it might make sense to consider the sale of an aircraft carrier plus Harriers to Argentina. The Veintecinco de Mayo (Argentina's aircraft carrier deployed in the early stages of the war) would need replacing in the late 1980s?..Argentina might be interested either in an Invincible class or the Hermes (which became the two most valuable and indispensable warships in the British Task Force)? This (sale, the book says) could be worth some 300-million pounds (about 550-million dollars)".

The Professor continues: "The (British) Naval Attaché in Buenos Aires suggested that the Sea Harrier could be promoted jointly with a carrier and Admiral Allara, then head of the Argentine Naval Mission in London (who later commanded the Argentine surface fleet at sea in the conflict) asked to visit the Invincible to see the Sea Harrier (which proved vital for the defence of the Task Force against air attack and for raids on Argentine troop positions to facilitate the British advance on land). "The Foreign Office noted that while such a sale might not fall foul of the guideline about not being used for internal repression (a condition of British arms sales), it certainly fell foul of that capable for use against the Falklands and, if pushed, would almost certainly be rejected by Ministers. Yet the FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) were also wary that offence might be given to Argentina by rejecting an idea for an order of some magnitude that would not make a lot of difference to the Falklands as similar equipment could be purchased elsewhere. (A French Clemenceau class carrier was one possibility).

"To avoid a decision (the Official History says) it was suggested that the Harrier might be more feasible without a carrier or that Ministers might be asked to consider the promotion, but not yet the supply, of a carrier. "In 1981, Nicholas Ridley (the Foreign Office Minister for South American affairs and for the Falklands sovereignty negotiations) agreed to a proposal for supply of two further ex-RAF Canberras but a tentative interest in refurbished long-range Vulcan bombers, which were about to leave RAF service after two decades as a nuclear strike force, was quashed at official level. In September 1981, there had been some discussion of the sale of a single Vulcan aircraft, which, it was assumed would not materially affect Argentina's strike capability. The FCO judged that a strike aircraft would ?be entirely suitable for an attack on the Falklands' (In fact, a British Vulcan bomber carried out an remarkable bomb attack on Stanley airport during Argentine occupation, in a complex long-distance flight from Ascension Island which took the Argentines by surprise and unnerved them psychologically).

"Nonetheless, Professor Freedman continues, continuing expressions of Argentine interest were forwarded. The Air Staff took the view that that the Vulcan would be perfectly suited to the Falklands) and would also alarm Chile (which supported Britain and feared Argentine invasion at that time). "In 1981 there was some discussion with Vickers (arms manufacturers) over a main battle tank (an order that went to Austria). "While FCO objections were a factor in holding back these sales, the difficulty of coming up with attractive tenders was another.

Extra defence resources denied to Falklands

"The Defence Attaché's assessment was that Britain was seen by the Argentine military as ?a useful source of comparative information and a potential supplier to be invited to quote' but ?in general regarded as slow and expensive'". (Note: So it was Argentine reluctance also a factor which prevented sale of British weapons which might otherwise have been used against the British Task Force). At the same time as considering the idea of weapons sales to Argentina, "the Ministry of Defence (and the Treasury) was reluctant to find extra resources for (defence) of the Falklands Islands". They had decided to scrap the ice patrol vessel Endurance as an economy measure (much to the dismay of the Falkland Islanders who regarded the ship as factual evidence of British commitment to them and to South Atlantic deployment.)

While weapons sales were being mooted, Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee issued in July 1981, a new assessment warning of possible Argentine actions, which the Official History lists as:

Harassment or arrest of British shipping.
Military occupation of one or more of the uninhabited islands.
Arrest of the British Antarctic Survey team on South Georgia.
Small scale military action against the Islands.
Full scale military invasion of the Islands.

Harold Briley, London

Official History of the Falklands Campaign (two volumes) published by Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group on behalf of Whitehall History Publishing, June 28th.