MercoPress. South Atlantic News Agency

FCO 1974 proposal to share Falklands with Argentina

“The war was a mistake; if we hadn't gone to war Argentina today would almost certainly have the Malvinas/Falklands”.

The statement belongs to Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de de Rozas, an outstanding Argentine diplomat with a long prestigious international career, ambassador in London, Paris, who twice presided over the Security Council and was only impeded from becoming United Nations Secretary General because of the Soviet Union veto.

In a long interview with Buenos Aires daily La Nacion, Ortiz de Rozas reveals some shell shocking details of negotiations, --initiative of the Foreign Office--, for the sharing of power over the Falkland Islands with Argentina in the seventies.

Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas recalls that back in 1966 when as Chargé d'Affairs and acting ambassador in London, he was invited to lunch by then Deputy Foreign Secretary for Latin American affairs Henry Hohler and Robin Edmonds head of the Falklands Department.

According to the Argentine official, Mr Hohler said that the Falklands no longer were of strategic value for the Royal Navy as had been the case during the two great wars, and "sooner or later the sovereignty dispute had to be solved and Argentina would recover control over the Islands".

However it couldn't happen suddenly, "you must conquer the minds and hearts of the Islanders so there's no resistance from their side", said Hohler.

The Argentine official immediately informed Buenos Aires and the long negotiations for the July 1971 Communications and links understanding followed.

How did the agreement work?

With scholarships for the children of the Islanders to study in the best English schools in Argentina; with the construction of a landing strip in the Islands and the air link of LADE; with the oil supplier YPF providing fuel?it was a gradual, steady confidence building policy? revealed Mr. Ortiz de Rozas.

"Then in June 1974 the British embassy in Buenos Aires proposed to the Argentine government a "condominium" for the Malvinas. It was an extraordinary proposal: English and Spanish would be the official languages; Islanders would be entitled to double nationality; no more passports. The governors of the Falklands would be named alternatively by the Queen and the Argentine President, and the Argentine flag would fly over the Islands?"

Did the Islanders support the proposal?

"The proposal had the approval of the Legislative and Executive Councils", according to Ortiz de Rozas who says he was given a copy of the Foreign Office proposal by Argentine Foreign Affairs minister Vignes.

Then President Peron very intelligently ordered his Foreign Affairs minister Vignes "this we must accept it immediately. Once we set foot in Malvinas there's no way they can take us out and soon we'll have full sovereignty".

However, two weeks later President Peron fell ill and died, and when Vignes addressed his successor, Peron's widow Isabel Martinez de Peron she frankly replied: "I don't have the General's political strength to sell this proposal to the Argentine public opinion".

"Evidently many Argentines would resist the shared sovereignty with that erroneous view of all or nothing; well it was nothing, but I can assure you we were very close to a diplomatic negotiated solution. Very, very close?" reflects Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas in the interview

And what about the 1982 landing?

"I was in Rome negotiating the Beagle channel islands dispute with Chile under the mediation of Pope John Paul when I received a phone call at 04:00 in the morning April 2 from Deputy minister Enrique Ross. It then dawned on me why in early January Chancellor Nicanor Mendez called me to let me know I was being transferred from ambassador in London to Rome, so I could closely follow the Beagle talks".

However, the British somehow heard about it particularly that Mr. Ortiz de Rozas was to be replaced by an admiral as ambassador in London. The British ambassador in Buenos Aires Anthony Williams cautioned that an Argentine military was not welcome as ambassador in London. Anyhow Mr. Ortiz de Rozas was asked to travel regularly to Rome for the Beagle negotiations where he became quite acquainted with Pope John Paul who travelled to Buenos Aires to beg the military to end to the war.

The political decision to go to war is described by the Argentine ambassador as a dramatic and gigantic error. "I pay homage, an emotive homage to those who died in combat for a just cause, but it set the clock of history way back".

Like as with Hong Kong, "I'm sure that we could have reached an agreement with the British by which after a few years they would recognize Argentine sovereignty over Malvinas".

"The last round of talks was February 27, 28 and March first 1982. We were negotiating a lease-back which anticipated a period of British administration before turning over full sovereignty. We were talking of one, two generations, 40, 50 years at the most. By 2030 at the most the Malvinas would have been Argentine without having fired a single shot, without the death of 600 good Argentines or the sadness that followed with all those veterans committing suicide", highlights Ortiz de Rozas.

For the Argentine ambassador "Malvinas have been, are and will be a national cause. But we don't have a state policy regarding the issue".

The last great landmark in effectively addressing the recovery of the Islands sovereignty was the Communications policy of the seventies, "which was much criticized by the ultras (radicals); people who systematically boycotted all attempts because they favour absolute solutions, the all or nothing attitude, forcing failure on every attempt to reach a peaceful solution. They were basically the military, but there were also many civilians who made the task of the Chancellery very difficult", confessed Oritz de Rozas.