The 25th anniversary of the end of a tragic war is a fitting time to regret the losses incurred. It is also a time to look forward and to avoid, once and for all, the repetition of such disasters. That requires an objective review of the past and an analysis of the future: this could be very bright, so long as all parties so wish and they undertake to make adjustments and, at times, the necessary sacrifices.
To begin with, we must admit that the Falklands "which is how they are known in the international arena" have been a kind of British overseas territory for 174 years. Irrespective of the degree of justification for the Argentine claim, the British have ruled the islands since 1833. A long time has passed. To change such an established status quo is inevitably difficult, particularly in the light of so many interests, obligations and resentments on both sides. I would like to tackle the issue principally as a challenge to Argentines. For the moment, let us leave the British and the Islanders to make their own evaluations (another inescapable phase of the process). I have known and loved Argentina now for 40 years. I hope that my friendly proposals stimulate realistic and productive thinking and actions, which are almost non-existent today in this long, sterile and, in 1982, bitterly tragic dispute. I wish to do the opposite to the lecturing of 21st June at the UN Decolonization Committee. That road leads nowhere, except, perhaps, to a more open conflict in an unclear future. As a good friend of Argentina, I regret to say that its sovereignty claim over the islands is based on four points which, objectively, range from being hardly convincing through to the ridiculous: - Spanish colonial rights, inherited on becoming independent from her in 1816. - After independence, brief occupation of some of the islands, until 1833. - Geographical proximity to the Argentine continental territory. - The "transitory" nature of the island population. Let us start with the old legal arguments. Those from Argentina are a little stronger than the UK's, but they are not conclusive and, ultimately, not even relevant. Why? Because Argentina has no need to put forward a better case than the UK: it has to overcome the obstacle of the very existence of the islanders, who have inhabited the archipelago since the early days of the Rosas era. The islanders, totalling several thousand, are anglophones and almost all are of Scottish or English descent. They have governed the islands for 174 years with some British support. They are afraid of losing their idiosyncrasy. They do not wish to see nearly two centuries of peaceful government being threatened by being incorporated to a country whose turbulent history of unpredictable adventures have ranged from democracy to dictatorships, from "dirty war" to the 1982 invasion. You know that this is true. Any truly objective observer must understand that the realities of these very dissimilar histories and cultures should overcome any legal claim dating back to the early decades of the 19th century. The weakest argument is the "transitory" nature of the island population, after 174 consecutive years residency. If we examine Argentina's colonization registers we will find a higher percentage of families in transit. I need not remind you that the greatest Argentine writer of all times, Jorge Luis Borges, reached the conclusion that, for various reasons, Argentines are "inhabitants" rather than "citizens" of their country. Remember too that Argentina, the same as the United States, exterminated the great majority of its aboriginal population, so its current population is no more native to its continental territory than are the islanders on the Falklands. The Argentine claim goes beyond the archipelago. Were it to be established as an international ruling, it could open a Pandora's Box and cause worldwide chaos. It upholds that any country which may wish to recover lost territory from a couple of centuries back has a right to getting it back, however weak its titles may have been at the time and regardless of what may have happened over all those years. Were this the case, the majority of UN member states would be prey to one or more expansionist neighbours. The argument of geographical proximity is equally unsustainable. Think what would happen if continental countries claimed all islands situated 350 nautical miles, or less, off their coasts, however different their cultures might be and however well established their independence. For example, Cuba and the Bahamas would become part of the United States; Cyprus, of Turkey or Syria; Japan, of Russia or Korea, and the UK, of France. A potentially stable solution to this dispute requires a simple formula which will lessen the nationalistic feelings and which would promise, in credible terms, concrete and progressive benefits which would be sufficient to survive the Argentines' unease. As a minimum [concession] Britain could recognise the Argentine claim, without acceding to it. Then all parties would agree a "cooling off" period of 175 years, under supervision of the UN. Another, more complex, alternative would be to reconsider the proposal made in 1982 by Peruvian president Fernando Belaunde Terry: to fly three flags over the islands -British, Argentine and UN - with safeguards to satisfy the population. Summing up, what is required is to follow Gilbert's advice in Iolanthe and to apply common sense to a very emotional and explosive issue. In this way London, Buenos Aires and Port Stanley could focus wholly on long term cooperation to develop fisheries, energy and other projects which are evidently very profitable all round. Recent agreements between Australia and Indonesia are useful examples of what can be done, if there is a will. What Argentine government might have the courage and the statesmanship qualities to promote such a plan? It is not for me to say, but I pray there may be one and that they may be able to convince their people. William Ratliff for LA NACION A member of the Hoover Institute, dependent of Stanford University, the author has made frequent visits to Argentina.William Ratliff is a research fellow and curator of the Americas Collection at the Hoover Institution. He is also an adjunct fellow at the Independent Institute. He is currently working on interpreting Latin American history and Chinese histories and politics and U.S. foreign policy. Ratliff is author of China's "Lessons" for Cuba's Transition (Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, 2004), Russia's Oil in America's Future (Hoover Essays in Public Policy, 2003), Doing it Wrong and Doing it Right: Education in Latin America and Asia (Hoover Essays in Public Policy, 2003), coauthor of Report from Havana (Cato Policy Analysis, 2001), with Jonathan Clarke; The Law and Economics of Development (Hoover Press, 2000), with Edgardo Buscaglia; A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean: Lift the Embargo on Cuba (Hoover Essays in Public Policy, 2000), with Roger Fontaine; and contributing coeditor of The Law and Economics of Development(JAI Press, 1997), with Buscaglia and Robert Cooter. He is also coauthor of Inside the Cuban Interior Ministry (Jamestown Foundation, 1994), with Juan Antonio Rodriguez Menier; The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas (Transaction Publishers, 1993), with Roger Miranda; and three Hoover Essays in Public Policy on legal reform and political/economic reform in Argentina, with Buscaglia, Maria Dakolias, and Fontaine. Among his other books are Castroism and Communism in Latin America and The Soviet-Cuban Presence in East Africa. He is contributing editor to The Media and the Cuban Revolution and coeditor of Juan Peron: Cartas del exilio. For two decades Ratliff was Latin American editor of the Hoover Institution's Yearbook on International Communist Affairs and for four years a contributor to the annual Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record. He has also been book review editor of the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs.Ratliff has interviewed two dozen foreign presidents and prime ministers, including Fidel Castro, Carlos Menem, Alberto Fujimori, and Lee Kwan Yew. He has published articles and commentaries from dozens of countries, among them Panama, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Greece, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, China, Vietnam, and Kazakhstan, in all major American and many foreign newspapers, including the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the International Herald Tribune, El Mercurio (Santiago), the Globe and Mail (Toronto), and the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong). He wrote from Cuba on the 25th anniversary of Castro's revolution and from the war zones of Nicaragua and El Salvador, for the Chicago Tribune.On the Internet, he writes for the MSNBC "Opinion" section and contributed to the award-winning Panama hand-over section of the on-line NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.He has been interviewed on CNN, NPR, PBS, APR, BBC, Voice of America, Radio Marti, and many other radio and TV stations around the world. Between 1978 and 1986 he was a columnist and chief editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune's newspaper <>Peninsula Times Tribune. In the mid-1970s he began writing on classical music for the Los Angeles Times and the Metropolitan Opera's Opera News.He has taught courses in English literature, Latin American and Chinese history, international relations, and journalism at Stanford, San Francisco State University, the University of San Francisco, Tunghai University in Taiwan, the Diplomatic Academy at Lake Tahoe and other universities; monitored elections in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Chile; and conducted private lecture tours in Latin America, China, and Southeast Asia. Ratliff obtained his B.A. from Oberlin College; his M.A. (Chinese history) and Ph.D (Latin American/Chinese history) are from the University of Washington in Seattle.
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