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Voting before the going gets tough. The president of Argentina brings forward mid-term elections

A piece from The Economist Intelligence Unite Views Wire on Argentina’s coming mid term elections sets out the scenario of the day after, and its consequences for the ruling Kirchner couple and obviously Argentine stability.
An issue too sensitive to be openly addressed in Argentina, the article basically states the election has turned into a referendum on the still powerful Kirchners.
“A heavy defeat for the candidates and allies of the governing Frente para la Victoria (FV, a faction of the Peronist party) could well hasten the end of their power, increasing the risk that the president will not see out her term (due to expire in January 2012) and presaging a bumpy political transition”.

Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, is betting that by bringing forward mid-term legislative elections by four months, to June 28th, she has improved her chances of retaining her slim majority in Congress. At the same time, she has thrown her opponents off balance, as they now hastily prepare for an early election. Yet despite the gambit, she will probably lose ground in the election, emerging weakened and forced to bargain with the opposition as never before. This will occur as economic conditions are worsening, further pressuring her administration.

Ms Fernández, who essentially co-governs with her powerful husband and predecessor as president, Néstor Kirchner, on March 13th requested that Congress advance the elections. Though the opposition rejected the bill, asserting that it was another step by the Kirchners to undermine Argentina's political institutions, the pro-government majority passed the measure narrowly on March 26th—by a margin of seven votes in the 257-seat lower house and by five in the 72-seat Senate.

Campaigning for the legislative election will officially start on April 29th, with one-half of the lower house (129 deputies) and one-third of the Senate (24 senators) in eight provinces up for grabs. This election will in effect be a referendum on the Kirchners. A heavy defeat for the candidates and allies of the governing Frente para la Victoria (FV, a faction of the Peronist party) could well hasten the end of their power, increasing the risk that the president will not see out her term (due to expire in January 2012) and presaging a bumpy political transition.

Better now than later

The president justified the early election on the basis that a lengthy campaign would be detrimental, given the challenges Argentina is facing from the global crisis. In reality, the Kirchners seem acutely aware that with the economic downturn set to deepen and fiscal and financing difficulties mounting, their popularity will decline further, and that the risks to them of holding the election in late October would be even higher. They also hope that by advancing the election they will deflect attention away from simmering tensions, including renewed conflict with farmers and rising concerns about insecurity and violent crime.

In addition, an early election gives the opposition forces less time to organize and limits the possibility of the formation of a single, united alliance between the two main opposition groupings—one comprising dissidents from the governing Peronist party allied with the centre-right Pro, and the other a loose coalition of the Coalición Cívica, the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), the socialists and supporters of the vice-president, Julio Cobos. Although never very likely, a united front could have materialized with more time and thus would have hit the Kirchners' chances even harder.

Maneuvering and sealing alliances

Following the passage of the bill to advance the election, the coalition formed in February between Mauricio Macri, the mayor of Buenos Aires and leader of the centre-right Pro party, and two legislators, Felipe Solá and Francisco de Narváez (both dissident Peronists), had to decide quickly who would head the list for representatives to the lower house in the key province of Buenos Aires. This was always going to be a source of unease between Mr de Narváez and Mr Solá when the alliance was originally announced, but a deal was reached without harming their nascent unity.

Mr de Narváez was chosen to lead the list, which will boost the alliance's appeal, since he commands broader support across the political spectrum than Mr Solá, whose support is more limited to disenchanted Peronists and who split only recently from the Kirchners (in November 2008).

Meanwhile, the possibility of an alliance between Elisa Carrió, the leader of the centre-left Coalición Cívica, and Gabriela Michetti, the deputy mayor of Buenos Aires city for the Pro, in the list of representatives for the city of Buenos Aires failed to materialise. Despite their ideological similarities, Peronists close to Mr Solá and Mr de Narváez urged Ms Michetti to end talks with Ms Carrió. As Ms Michetti appears well placed in the opinion polls, her allies in the Pro considered that she did not need Ms Carrió's votes. These developments contributed to putting paid to the (remote) possibility of an alliance between the two main opposition groupings.

For its part, the political alliance between the Coalición Cívica, UCR, socialists and supporters of Mr Cobos is prepared to file joint candidates in such key districts as the city of Buenos Aires and the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Córdoba. Ms Carrió is not standing as a candidate in the election (partly because she did not want to risk standing against Ms Michetti). Instead, a former president of the Central Bank, Adolfo Prat-Gay, will head this alliance's list of candidates for representatives to the lower house in Buenos Aires city. He will be pitted against Ms Michetti, who will lead Mr Macri's list.

As for the governing FV, as of mid-April former President Kirchner was manoeuvring to head the congressional list in Buenos Aires province, together with Daniel Scioli, the province’s popular governor. This arrangement would boost the FV’s electoral prospects but is unorthodox because Mr Scioli is unlikely to give up the governorship should he win. The Peronist party will finalise the list at a party meeting on April 24th.

Already suffering a defeat

Meanwhile, the Kirchners have already suffered a heavy electoral defeat, in Catamarca province, the first local contest of the year, on March 8th—a blow that contributed to their decision to bring the election forward. The Frente Cívico, led by Eduardo Brizuela del Moral, the current governor of Catamarca province and formerly a Kirchner ally but now an ally of Mr Cobos, defeated by a margin of 10 percentage points the so-called PJ Unido grouping backed by Mr Kirchner, Luis Barrionuevo (a trades union leader) and Ramón Saadi (a Kirchnerist congressman).

The defeat was significant, because Mr Kirchner decided to support the PJ Unido alliance and give it a national platform in an attempt to defeat the UCR in general and Mr Cobos in particular. But this backfired, delivering a victory for Mr Cobos and the Kirchners' first ever defeat in local elections. Adding insult to injury, Mr Saadi and Mr Barrionuevo blamed the Kirchners for the loss, and many other popular candidates who would previously have sought their backing are now shunning the presidential couple in their campaigns for the local elections.

Apr 22nd 2009 From “The Economist” Intelligence Unit ViewsWire