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Falklands War - Official History: “Result could have been different”

New revelations in the soon to be published British official “History of the Falklands Campaign” indicate that a few key acts by Argentine commanders could have produced a different outcome, possibly avoiding defeat.

And, if General Galtieri's military junta had shown restraint instead of launching an impetuous invasion, Argentina may peacefully have attained its long-term ambition of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands because economic and social stagnation and population decline before 1982 could eventually have made the situation "untenable". These are two of the many controversial arguments examined in this official history, written by one of Britain's foremost military academics, Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, who is Professor of War Studies at King's College, London, invited by the Government to carry out the task. He has taken eight years to collate and assess masses of information, much of it hitherto secret intelligence. The issue is comprehensively covered in two volumes. The first deals with the origins of the Anglo-Argentine dispute going back centuries and with the run-up to invasion. The second volume covers the conduct of the war and its aftermath until diplomatic relations were restored in 1990. The two volumes run to more than 130,000 words and cost £90, published by Frank Cass Limited. In advance of publication, Professor Freedman has given extensive clues to his conclusions in an article in the magazine "History Today".

Secret Intelligence Files

Professor Freedman had access to secret official files which focus fresh light on the help given to the United Kingdom by Chile and the United States and also on the tensions that developed in American- British relations in the immediate aftermath of the invasion as President Ronald Reagan and his Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, acted at first as even-handed intermediaries in an attempt to achieve a diplomatic settlement. At the same time the Pentagon and the United States military were making "extraordinary efforts" to supply equipment and materials, for example updated side-winder missiles which proved so effective on Harrier jump-jet aircraft. The history may also explain the mystery of why a helicopter carrying elite SAS troops made an emergency landing on Chilean territory.

Belgrano - military not political decision

The history examines at length the controversial sinking by torpedo of the Argentine cruiser Belgrano with the loss of more than 300 lives. Professor Freedman says that the British decision to sink the Belgranowas a reflection of weakness rather than strength - a fear that the task force was vulnerable to an audacious Argentine naval attack. He rejects the argument that the Prime Minister "wanted the cruiser sunk to prevent a peace settlement because she wanted to fight and win a war". He says the Argentines' major success was the sinking of the container ship Atlantic Conveyor, with the loss of several helicopters, which made movement of the troops on land "extremely difficult". The land forces commander, Brigadier Julian Thompson, wanted to wait for massive reinforcement with the arrival of the 5th Infantry Brigade, but the War Cabinet wished to regain the military initiative after British ship losses and because it feared that international pressure would force a ceasefire leaving British forces with only a "toehold" on the Falklands. This thinking led to the battle for Goose Green. The "tragedy" of heavy British losses with the bombing of the troopship Sir Galahad near Bluff Cove resulted from "competition for scarce resources".

Success not taken for granted

Professor Freedman emphasises that "success could by no means be taken for granted" as the military commanders knew at the time. In this, he echoes the assessment by the task force commander, Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward, that it was a close-run outcome as ammunition was expended and his ships were mercilessly battered by Argentine air attack and severe Atlantic weather. The professor points out that it was a war fought with a "small margin for error". The campaign and individual military engagements "could be turned by a moment of heroism or a loss of nerve, by an act of will or a critical error". He suggests the outcome could have been different if the Argentines had not made a series of military errors such as not keeping their navy at sea after the sinking of the Belgrano, or by attacking warships instead of the ships carrying troops and equipment, and by not patrolling "more aggressively" as the British advanced towards the capital. If they had acted differently, he says, "the result could have been different. And the loss of one of the two British aircraft carriers would have forced the British Government to reconsider".

Exploring "lingering controversies"

With so many previous accounts of the war written by the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, other Ministers, military commanders, diplomats and journalists, and with so many contradictions, he says an official history, given access to the best possible official documentary information, can explore the "lingering controversies" and also examine how Britain arrived at some decisions and not others. Professor Freedman recognises that access to so much official material might have resulted in a "sanitised account" confirming the "official line" and expressing only "safe and agreed opinions". He insists that the credibility of his history depends on it being his "own independent review". While accounts of the military campaign remain confused, Professor Freedman has benefited from full diplomatic information available from two key ambassadors, Sir Nicholas Henderson in Washington, and Sir Anthony Parsons at the United Nations.

Falklands pre-1982 decline "untenable"

On the history of Anglo-Argentine negotiations in the 1960s and 1970s, he says they foundered on two competing forms of language - whether "the wishes of the Islanders should be paramount" giving them a veto, or whether "their interests" should "merely be taken into account" which meant their judgment could be over-ruled. By the early 1980s the Argentines became convinced that "the British had no policy other than procrastination". Before 1982, Professor Freedman points out that economic and social development and the population had been declining. "If Argentina had shown restraint, this decline would probably have continued until the situation eventually became untenable". Instead, Argentine lack of restraint led, after the war, to a much stronger garrison, the new Mount Pleasant airport for rapid reinforcement, a booming economy and an increase in population. "The islanders", he says, "gained an economic and political stability they had hitherto lacked and the Argentines got rid of their military junta and began a period of democratic government". When the history is published shortly, it is bound to result in extensive reviews by many experts and also in reaction in the United Kingdom, Argentina, Chile and the United States on Professor Freedman's conclusions and on the secret intelligence revelations. Professor Freedman has published two previous books on the conflict - "Britain and the Falklands War" in 1988 and, in collaboration with an Argentine analyst, Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse , "Signals of War" in 1990.

Harold Briley, London

Categories: Falkland Islands.

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