MercoPress. South Atlantic News Agency

British-Argentine 1981 secret plans revealed

The duplicity employed by the British Government and Foreign Office to negotiate secretly for the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina without at first telling the Falkland Islanders in the early 1980s is exposed in the Official History of the Falklands by Professor of War Studies, Sir Lawrence Freedman, just published in the United Kingdom.

The Islanders' consent was only to be sought later. The Foreign office Minister involved, Nicholas Ridley, went to great lengths to keep secret a meeting he had with the Argentine Deputy Foreign Secretary, Air Force Comodoro Cavandoli. At first he even suggested they met informally while fishing together on a Scottish river bank.

Instead, after considering a series of venues away from the prying eyes of the public and press, they chose Lake Geneva, in the picturesque village Hotel du Lac. The cover story, according to Professor Freedman, was that "Mr Ridley's visit to Geneva with his wife is private for a short holiday break and that he hopes to do a little water colour painting".

In fact, the real plan was to negotiate transfer of sovereignty to Argentina with simultaneous lease-back for the Islanders to continue their British way of life for an indefinite period, of 99 years. Both Ministers were sworn to secrecy and to avoid leaks of their true purpose.

The Argentine Minister was accompanied by his private secretary, Commandante Bloomer-Reeve, later civil administrator in the Falklands after the invasion, who warned that the minister would have great difficulty avoiding leaks, as "he is watched day and night, not only by the Press but by others in the Ministry and the establishment who do not like or trust him. Asking a junior Foreign Minister to enter into secret discussions on the Falklands is rather like asking a junior Israeli Foreign Minister to enter secret discussion on the Gaza strip".

Exchanges "must never become public knowledge"

They hatched a plan for titular sovereignty to be transferred to Argentina with a 99-year leaseback for the Islanders to continue their "way of life under British institutions, laws and practices ?.The British and Argentine flags would be flown side by side on public buildings" and there would be a British Governor, a locally-elected Council?and an Argentine Commissioner-General? and "a Joint Council over economic development of the Islands and their maritime zone".

It was agreed that the secret exchanges "must never become public knowledge". Ridley called it the best package we can get?and not bad one". He believed "it can be sold to the Islanders".

"Word came back from Buenos Aires that Cavandoli was ?bubbling with pleasure' over Ridley's company, very pleased with the content, though careful to say that the answer is not for him to give".

The British and Argentine Foreign Secretaries, Lord Carrington and Señor Pastor, later met in New York and Pastor expressed satisfaction. Ridley was to go to the Falklands "to work on the Islanders" to seek endorsement for formal negotiations but "would not go into the details of any solution with the Islanders". The Argentines "offered, somewhat bizarrely, to help get him there anonymously from Rio de Janeiro". The Governor, Rex Hunt, was alerted to the possibility of a visit "to be portrayed as tentative and for general pastoral purposes. No expectations should be raised".

Argentines asked "not to be too nice"

The Foreign Office wanted to know from Argentina whether the proposals were "broadly acceptable". The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams, warned that the Argentines "might jib at our acceptance of their decision made conditional on the wishes of the sheep farmers in the Islands". In fact the Argentine Junta agreed to the plan but wanted a shorter lease-back period.

Ridley urged the Argentines that his visit to Buenos Aires en route to the Falkland Islands should attract "no publicity". He did not even want the Argentines to be "too nice in public about us' and to be a "little more pressing when I arrive in Buenos Aires". He wanted them to complain about lack of progress. "It was considered to be politically safer to present the situation as one of antagonism".

In the Falklands, Ridley assured the Islanders Britain would not do anything unacceptable to the Islanders". During the visit, Islander opinion against negotiations and lease-back hardened. But Rex Hunt reported that it had made them "think instead of drift". The official history says he felt the Islanders were not getting guidance and leadership from Councillors. "There was a battle between heart and head. He compared the attitude of many as an Israeli asked to hand over his contrary to the Arabs. .. They cannot stomach the thought of the Islands belonging to Argentina".
They felt Britain would protect them and not let them down.

The initiative was killed not so much by the lukewarm reception in the Islands but the hostile reception in Parliament (in London). Ridley wrote to Cavandoli, expressing gratitude for his "careful and reticent line". The Argentine press criticised lease-back as "insulting, tasteless and indecent".

Make Islanders "flesh creep"

In Buenos Aires, the British Ambassador, Anthony Williams, impatiently argued for "lease-back as the only way forward". He was ready to go to the Islands to ?wake councillors up by making their flesh creep with expert advice on potential Argentine frightfulness'. He said "it was unrealistic to expect the dangers inherent in the current situation to be appreciated on the Islands unless the signals came out loud and clear from the UK?..His prophecies of doom became increasingly hard to ignore". He warned that it was deceptive to pretend there was any possibility of a convergence of view between the Islanders and the Argentines".

By the end of 1981, the Islanders suspected they were paying the penalty for having incurred the displeasure of Her Majesty's Government by deliberately refusing to accept the favoured lease-back solution. Life was deliberately being made difficult to attempt to bring them to heel."

Secret analysis on "use of military power"

In December, General Leopoldo Galtieri took power as President with a new Junta, which made the Falklands its "top priority", and decided "to reactivate to the fullest extent all negotiations for sovereignty".

It resolved to "analyse the possibility of the use of military power to obtain the political objective", adding that "This resolution must be kept in strict secrecy and should be circulated only to the heads of the respective military departments".

Military plans were to be prepared by mid-March., ready for implementation in "a bloodless occupation". The invasion was launched on April 2nd.

Harold Briley, London.

Categories: Falkland Islands.

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