Assessing how to react to possible Argentine aggression against the Falkland Islands, the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) declared in 1981 that the proposed diminution in Britain's amphibious capability in that year's Defence Review ? later reversed ? would mean that reinforcement, subsequent to an Argentine invasion, would be extremely difficult, if not impossible.
The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, just published in Britain (June 28th), says that the MoD judged that ?such an option after an invasion was remote'. "The operations staff had severe doubts as to it is a serious political response. It was judged that ?retaking of the Islands after an Argentine invasion is barely militarily viable and would present formidable problems".
In a somewhat defeatist and pessimistic assessment, the MoD, responding to an intelligence committee assessment of possible Argentine actions, said that "the nearest practicable staging post, Ascension Island, rules out effective reinforcement by air, even using air-to-air refuelling". There would be a very fine line between success and failure when operating from Ascension Island, some 3285 nautical miles away and with no access to South American airfields".
Implausible to defend Falklands
"Passing on these findings, a Wing Commander observed: ?I hope you now have sufficient ammunition to shoot down the idea that RAF aircraft may assist in the implausible task of trying to defend the Falklands'
"To deter a full-scale military invasion, an extremely expensive, balanced task force would be required??One senior official observed that ?it would be practical nonsense, besides which Suez (a failed British operation) would look sensible, for us to attempt to engage in serious operations against a perfectly competent and well-equipped local opponent off the toe of South America'.
Harold Briley, London
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