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Book Review: Official History of Falklands Conflict

The first comprehensive history of the 1982 Falklands War, published in Britain, reveals that Britain had previously contemplated selling Argentina powerful weapons such as an aircraft carrier and a Vulcan bomber, confirms the valuable help given Britain by the United States and Chile, examines controversial military actions such as the sinking of the Argentine cruiser Belgrano and HMS Sheffield, and the Battle for Goose Green, discusses the tensions over media reporting, and exposes how the British Government deceived the Falkland Islanders over secret talks with Argentina for transfer of titular sovereignty in return for a long lease-back period of continuing British rule.

The book, entitled "The Official History of the Falklands Campaign", has been compiled by the Professor of War Studies and Vice-Principal of King's College London, Sir Lawrence Freedman, at the instigation of the British Government.

It is an impressive, well-written account full of detail and discussion of the many military actions, the difficulties and dangers faced by front-line combatants, individual heroism and setbacks, the complex political and military decisions facing the Governments and commanders, and the historical background stretching back several centuries. It is illustrated with maps but sadly no pictures.

Much of the material is familiar, having previously been revealed and analysed in contemporaneous media, and later, official reports, and in more than 200 books. But this mammoth work, researched and written over a period of nine years, brings the whole intriguing conflict all together under the expert eye of a distinguished military historian, with unprecedented access to secret intelligence documents, which show there are still revelations to come to light.

Invasion decision and timing

Professor Freedman concludes that the decision to invade was made on March 24, nine days before the invasion on April 2, and was triggered by the United Kingdom's crisis management in reacting forcefully to the unauthorised landing of Argentine scrap metal dealers on South Georgia. The actual order to go ahead with the invasion was not given until late the preceding day, April 1st. The BBC Monitoring Service reported that the Argentine fleet had set sail from Puerto Belgrano on March 28th. But a decision discussing military action was taken by President Galtieri's Junta two months earlier, on or about January 19th, with a National Strategy Directive, which declared:

"The Military Committee, faced with the evident and repeated lack of progress in negotiations with Great Britain to obtain recognition of our sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, convinced that the prolongation of the situation affects national honour, the full exercise of sovereignty and the exploration of resources, has resolved to analyse the possibility of the use of military power to obtain the political objective. This resolution must be kept in strict secrecy and should be circulated only to the heads of the respective military departments".

Margaret Thatcher's Government and the Intelligence services were absolved from failure to foresee the invasion by an official inquiry held after the conflict (by the Franks Committee).

Chile help and Tierra del Fuego invasion plan

Co-operation by Chile concentrated on acquisition of intelligence about Argentine military movements. British reconnaissance aircraft were stationed on Chilean territory, including the remote island of San Felix, and refuelled at the port of Conception. They carried out valuable reconnaissance for the British over the South Atlantic.

At one stage, British Military Commanders considered invading the Argentine half of the island of Tierra del Fuego which has two airfields at Ushuaia and Rio Grande and an oilfield. This would have been a blow to Argentine pride, given Britain a bargaining counter in future negotiations, and made available military facilities which might otherwise be used against the British Task Force. But it would have required collusion by Chile which occupies the other half of Terra del Fuego. The plan was ruled out as too risky and it would have caused "a political storm".

General Pinochet's full support

Chile did agree to delay taking delivery of a Royal Fleet Auxiliary Tanker, Tidepool sold to them, which the Chileans filled with fuel at Curacao, easing British problems of replenishing the task force. The tanker sailed on April 14th to rendezvous with the Task Force and played a key role in the recapture of South Georgia.

President Pinochet gave his full support, later declaring: "When Argentine forces occupied the Falklands in 1982, I instructed my government to provide, within the context of our neutrality, whatever assistance we could to our friend and ally. I considered this a matter of Chile's national honour".

In return for its co-operation, the Chilean Air Force Commander-in- Chief, General Fernando Matthei, later confirmed that Britain sold Chile Canberra reconnaissance aircraft, several Hawker Hunter jet fighters, and powerful radar equipment at cheap prices.

In fact, Chile was also motivated by self-preservation, fearing that it might itself be attacked by Argentina in their dispute over sovereignty of the Beagle Channel Islands. Britain was helped by the presence of large Chilean forces on the Argentine border, tying down two top Argentine Marine infantry Brigades so preventing their deployment in Falklands.

United States unstinting speedy support

United States military support was even more extensive, after failure of its marathon diplomatic mediation attempt by Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, to secure a peace accord. The American Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, wholeheartedly supported Britain from the very beginning, giving "scant attention to (Haig's) delicate line of impartiality". Despite Haig's request that this support be "toned down, it carried on regardless". Weinberger promised the British Ambassador that the Untied States "would supply everything (Britain) needed ? and "do it very quickly? with a minimum of bureaucratic formalities". Weinberger intervened "to ensure that the larger and more difficult items were made available immediately at whatever the cost to US forces requirements".

The Americans made available its facilities on Ascension Island including large-scale accommodation and extra fuel for the extraordinary British air re-supply effort. It provided satellite intelligence information over the South Atlantic.

120-million dollars of US weaponry

During May Britain procured some 120-million dollars worth of US material, including 100 updated sidewinder missiles for the Harriers, Vulcan/Phalanx anti-missile gun systems for the carrier Illustrious, Shrike missiles for Vulcan bombers, helicopter engines, submarine detection devices for Sea King helicopters, Stinger ground-to-air missiles, ammunition, conversion of the SS Stena Inspector for use as a repair ship in the South Atlantic, and 4,700 tons of airstrip matting for Stanley airport once it was recaptured. The equipment was flown immediately to the United Kingdom or Ascension Island.

US aircraft carrier offer

The United States offered to move one of its Carrier groups from the Caribbean to the South Atlantic to demonstrate support. It also discussed the possible transfer of an aircraft carrier to Britain but because US personnel could not be involved in combat, the training of a British crew was impracticable.

Bizarrely, the United States, under a previous agreement, also acceded to an Argentine request for photographical reconnaissance over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and over the open ocean. Refusal would have put at risk the civilian space programme in co-operation with many countries.

In response to British concern, Haig said the US had to honour the agreement but the civilian LANDSAT satellite pictures of low resolution were not capable of providing significant military intelligence, and the Americans promised to give the same data to Britain.

World-wide halt to exocet missiles

The history also discusses the success of Britain's world-wide operation to prevent Argentina acquiring more French-made exocet missiles which proved so devastating in attacks on British ships. The British Defence Secretary, John Nott, authorised agents to pose as genuine weapons purchasers on the international market to outbid the Argentines and also covertly render exocet missiles inoperable with information provided by the French. Argentina had three exocet missiles left and had ordered another five. Peru had ordered up to six, likely to end up in Argentina. Iraq had used 45 of its 65 exocets in its war against Iran, which was reported to have captured nine intact and offered them to Libya and Argentina. Pakistan had 12, and 30 ordered by South Africa and 10 by Qatar had not been delivered.

"In spite of strenuous efforts by several countries, particularly the Israelis and South Africans" John Nott said, "we succeeded in intercepting and preventing the supply of further equipment to the Argentineans, who were desperately seeking re-supply".

Argentine weapons supplies

Israel denied providing weapons to Argentina but British troops found Israeli equipment in Stanley. Libya was a major arms supplier, on direct flights by Argentine aircraft from Tripoli to Recife in Brazil, delivering substantial loads including missiles, Mirage spares and fuel tanks and ammunition.

Brazil was reported to be ready to sell Argentina maritime patrol aircraft, Venezuela was making available increased range fuel tanks for Argentine Mirage aircraft, and Peru was asked for five Mirage fighters. But President Belaunde Terry who was personally involved in peace-making efforts, resisted this and other requests for Peruvian military assistance.

Ecuador supplied a large stockpile of artillery ammunition which was largely unserviceable. Several South American countries, particularly Peru, Brazil and Venezuela, would provide substantial military assistance available if Britain attacked mainland Argentina.

Britain delayed its sales of equipment to Venezuela and Brazil (including torpedoes), and Germany assured Britain it would not deliver six naval corvettes and two submarines it was building for Argentina.

"The Official History of the Falklands Campaign" is published by Routledge Taylor and Francis on behalf of Whitehall History Publishing. The two volumes, published on June 28th, cover the historical origins of the dispute (£39.95) and the war itself (£49.95), with more than 1100 pages

Harold Briley, London

Harold Briley was the BBC Latin America Correspondent and later World Service Defence Correspondent, with first-hand knowledge of Argentina, the Falkland Islands and British military affairs. He was personally thanked by the Falkland Islands Government and people for his reporting, by the Chief of Defence Staff, and by the Governor, Sir Rex Hunt, for boosting Islander morale with his broadcasts during the Argentine invasion and occupation. The Argentines also acknowledged the quality of BBC broadcasts.

Categories: Falkland Islands.

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